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BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages and injuries suffered on 
January 13, 1973 when an automobile driven by defendant-
appellant Jolene Jaye Simons struck Judith Johnson, a pedes-
trian. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried September 9 through 11, 1975, before 
a jury in Salt Lake City, Utah, Honorable James S. Sawaya of the 
Third Judicial District Court presiding. Judgment was entered on 
the jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs-respondents for $1,500 
special damages and $35,000 general damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-appellants seek reversal of the lower court 
judgment, or, in the alternative, an order remanding the case for 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANTS1 REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 19. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II. WHERE CONFUSION EXISTED CONCERNING WHETHER THE 
CASE WAS BEING TRIED UNDER PRINCIPLES OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE 
ISSUES TO THE JURY ON A SPECIAL VERDICT. 
POINT III.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUMMON THE 
JURY PANEL AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANTS AND IN 
DENYING DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO READ JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1-A TO THE JURY. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 13, 1973, defendant-appellant Jolene Jaye Simons,* 
then 16 years old, while driving an automobile registered in the 
name of her father, Dan C. Simons, struck plaintiff-respondent 
Judith Johnson, a pedestrian, then also 16 years old. The 
pedestrian, through her father as guardian ad litem, brought an 
action for negligence against the driver and her father. Defen-
dants denied the allegations of negligence and alleged sole or 
contributory negligence on the part of the injured pedestrian. 
At trial the evidence showed that the collision occurred 
after dark at approximately 6:00 p.m. on Highland Drive at about 
6350 South in Salt Lake County at a place where there were no 
sidewalks, curb, or gutter; no marked crosswalk, semaphore signal 
or other traffic control devices; and only very sparse street 
lighting. The street was wet but not frozen, and snow from 
*By the time of trial, Jolene Jaye Simons was married. In 
the trial transcript she is usually referred to as Mrs. McBride. 
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earlier snowfalls was evidenced by remaining snowbanks off the 
travelled portion of the street. Traffic was moderately heavy 
southbound, with cars travelling both immediately in front of and 
behind the collision vehicle. 
The driver testified that she was travelling southbound on 
Highland Drive when she glanced briefly at the speedometer. As 
she again focused her eyes on the road she saw the pedestrian 
immediately in front of her right fender and was unable to avoid 
hitting her. The pedestrian came in contact with the car at a 
point approximately twelve inches from the right front side of 
the car near the right headlight. The pedestrian was thrown onto 
the hood, glanced off the right front windshield and top portion 
of the car, and came to rest to the west of and off the travelled 
portion of the roadway. 
The driver immediately pulled off the road and then started 
backing up the street to where the impact occurred. A Deputy 
Sheriff who had been following either in the first or second car 
behind the accident vehicle, but who was unaware of the collision, 
stopped Miss Simons as she backed up the street. He was informed 
of the accident after which he walked back along the roadway, and 
after a few moments of searching, found the injured plaintiff 
near a snowbank west of the travelled portion of the road. (Tr. 
13-32) 
The only eye witnesses to the accident were Miss Simons' two 
-3-
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younger brothers (ages 14 and 11) who were seated in the front 
seat with her. At trial the driver testified that she was 
travelling about 30 miles per hour, that she was near the center 
line of the two lane roadway, and that the pedestrian was well 
into the travelled portion of the roadway at the point of impact. 
The pedestrian suffered retrograde amnesia and had no 
recollection of the events immediately before the accident. (Tr. 
63-64) However, the pedestrian testified that she lived on the 
east side of Highland Drive; that she had been to the house of a 
friend on the west side of Highland Drive which was within walking 
distance from her own home; that she frequently walked home from 
her friend's house by following the same customary route; and 
that the place where the accident occurred was where she custom-
arily crossed over to the east side of Highland Drive to get 
home. (Tr. 72-73) 
Plaintiffs1 expert witness, David Lord, testified that the 
probable point of impact was "some distance north of where the 
body actually came to rest and it would be on the west side of 
the road,11 and added, "Now, the exact position I would--! wouldn't 
even be able to make a wild guess." (Tr. 130) Newell K. Knight, 
called as an expert witness for defendants, testified that the 
evidence would just as easily support the conclusion that the 
pedestrian was well into the travelled portion of the highway 
when hit. (Tr. 149-155) 
The court approved the right to make a record at a later 
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time of counsel's exceptions to the jury instructions given by 
the court. (Tr. 167 and Supplemental Transcript of Proceedings 
before the court on October 6, 1975, pages 29-30). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
Counsel for defendants-appellants asked the court to give 
its requested jury instruction No. 19 which states: 
Contributory negligence is negligence on the part 
of the person injured which, cooperating with the 
negligence of another, assists in proximately causing 
her own injury. 
One who is guilty of contributory negligence may 
not recover from another for any injury suffered 
because if both parties were at fault in negligently 
causing an accident, the degree of negligence cannot be 
weighed by the jury. (R. 92) 
This is standard J.I.F.U. Instruction No. 15.5 and is customarily 
given to govern a contributory negligence issue. While counsel 
were considering jury instructions in chambers with Judge Sawaya, 
the judge said that the substance of defendants' requested 
instruction No. 19 would be included in stock instructions pre-
pared by the judge and customarily given by him. He then noted 
in the lower right-hand corner of the instruction, in his own 
handwriting: 
"9-11-75 given in substance JSS" 
-R-
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However, the critical phrase in defendants' requested 
instruction No. 19--namely, "One who is guilty of contributory 
negligence may not recover from another for any injury suffered...11 
--was never given by the court. 
The first sentence of defendants1 requested instruction No. 
19 defining contributory negligence was covered in Jury Instruction 
No. 15 given by the court. (R. 142) The last part of the second 
sentence of defendants1 requested Jury Instruction No. 19 was 
covered by Jury Instruction No. 17 given by the court as follows: 
The law forbids you to attempt to classify negli-
gence into degrees or grades or kinds, or to compare 
one instance of negligence with another and judge which 
is more deserving of reproof or excuse. If you should 
find that there was negligent conduct on the part of 
both the plaintiff and defendant, you are not to 
attempt to determine which was guilty of the greater 
negligence. (R. 144) 
Still missing, however, is the heart of defendants1 re-
quested instruction No. 19 which would have advised the jury that 
upon finding the injured party was contributorily negligent, no 
award of damages should be made. 
The law clearly requires the court to inform the jury of 
the legal effect of contributory negligence. 57 Am.Jur.2d Negli-
gence, §§298, 299 (1971). For example, in Case v. Peterson, 
17 Wash. 2d 523, 136 P.2d 192, 194 (1943), the court stated: 
When the court instructs a jury on a subject such 
as contributory negligence, it should define the term 
and then advise what effect it should give to a finding 
that contributory negligence existed as a guide to the 
verdict it should render. Gallup v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 
295 Pa. 203, 145 A. 73; Pawnee Farmers' Elevator & Supply 
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Co, v. Powell, 76 Colo. .1, 227 P. 836, 37 A.L.R. 6; 
Frederick Cotton Oil & Mfg. Co. v. Traver, 36 Okl. 717, 
129 P. 747. The trial court was in error in not so 
instructing the jury. 
In Smith v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co., 
498 P.2d 402, 405 (Okla. 1972), the court noted: 
Thus, the jury is to be clearly instructed that if 
they find and believe from the evidence that primary 
negligence and proximate cause have been established, 
then their verdict should be for the plaintiff; but if 
they do not so find, or do find from the evidence that 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as defined in 
the instructions, then their verdict should be for the 
defendant. Whether the court uses the word "should" or 
"must" is not of great importance. . . Either word used 
in the contributory negligence instruction will inform 
the jury that plaintiff is not entitled to a verdict if 
they find and believe from the evidence that the 
plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence caused 
or contributed to his injuries. 
The Utah Supreme Court has taken a similar position. In 
Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 P. 893, 896 (1929), the court 
noted: 
The jury should have been instructed that it was 
the duty of the plaintiff to yield the right of way to 
the defendant as the two approached the intersection if 
it would have reasonably appeared to a reasonable and 
prudent man under the circumstances existing and the 
relative speed at which they were driving that a 
collision was to be apprehended. The jury should also 
have been instructed that if, under such conditions, 
the plaintiff failed to yield the right of way, and 
that such failure on his part proximately contributed 
to the accident, he could not recover, (emphasis added) 
Similarly, in Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co., 75 Utah 87, 
283 P. 160, 166-177 (1929), the Utah Supreme Court dealt with the 
specific issue of contributory negligence of a pedestrian and 
held: 
*7 
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All that it is intended to hold is that defendant 
is entitled to have his theory of the case presented to 
the jury. Briefly, they were entitled to have the jury 
told, in substance, that, in crossing or attempting to 
cross a public street, it was the duty of the deceased 
to exercise due care and reasonable vigilance to 
discover approaching vehicles, and that, if the jury 
should find that as a matter of fact the deceased 
failed to do what due care required by suddenly, 
without looking, stepping out from the curb line between 
two parked cars directly into or in front of defendants1 
car at a time and under such circumstances that defendants1 
agent could not, by the exercise of ordinary care, have 
avoided the accident they might find such conduct to be 
negligent on the part of the deceased, and, if they 
further found that such negligence directly contributed 
to the accident, then plaintiff could not recover. 
(emphasis added) 
As described more fully under Point II hereafter, this 
instruction was of critical importance because the court, in the 
course of impanelling the jury, had made confusing mention of the 
fact that a recent change in the law meant that this case would 
be tried under different principles than those which some of the 
prospective jurors may have applied in other cases during their 
term of jury service. 
Furthermore, as described more fully under Point III here-
after, failure to instruct the jury that contributory negligence 
bars recovery by an injured party created not only possible 
confusion and error by the jury but actual confusion and error. 
Seven of the eight jurors concluded that the pedestrian was 
guilty of contributory negligence, yet awarded her damages. The 
dissenting juror believed the pedestrian was solely negligent* 
Two of the jurors thought there was a jury instruction saying 
that the plaintiff could not recover if she was contributorily 
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negligent; however, in searching the instructions furnished by 
the court, they found none to that effect, and therefore joined 
in approving an award to the plaintiff even though they believed 
she was also negligent. (R. 54; See also Appendix A and Appendix 
B to this brief). 
POINT II 
WHERE CONFUSION EXISTED CONCERNING WHETHER THE 
CASE WAS BEING TRIED UNDER PRINCIPLES OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE 
ISSUES TO THE JURY ON A SPECIAL VERDICT 
Because of the confusion injected into the trial of this 
case by a change in the law (from contributory to comparative 
negligence) after the date of the subject accident, and because 
of the court's confusing reference to that change while impanel-
ling the jury, defendants-appellants requested that the issues be 
submitted to the jury on special verdict. (R.69-72) This request 
was denied (R.69) and the case was submitted to the jury on a 
general verdict. (R.65-66 and 165) 
In January, 1973, the Utah State Legislature enacted the 
provisions now contained in Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-
37, and related provisions, which took effect on May 8, 1973. 
The effect of this legislation was to preserve contributory 
negligence as a bar to recovery for injuries suffered before the 
effective date, but to adopt principles of comparative negligence 
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in awarding damages for injuries suffered after the effective 
date of this legislation. The accident which is the subject of 
this present action occurred in January, 1973, the month when the 
legislative change was enacted, but before the effective date of 
the change. 
*'.'•  The prospective jurors summoned in this action were serving 
in the third and last month of their term which commenced July 1, 
1975. During that term the court had tried injury cases which 
had arisen after May 8, 1973, and which were therefore tried 
under principles of comparative negligence. 
In the presence of all prospective jurors and before the 
jury panel was selected and sworn, the following dialogue took 
place while the jury was being impanelled: 
*.U JU ^»- -»,. *.U JU ' • •' 
/\ /v /\ s\ /\ /\ 
THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen, as I have indicated-
well, let me get a show of hands how many of you have 
served as Jurors before. That's generally most of you. 
Thank you. 
How many of you have served on a case involving an 
automobile or an auto-pedestrian accident or any kind 
of vehicle accident where one party was suing to 
recover damages as the result of injury or property 
damage? Let me have a show of hands. 
Mrs. Rasmussen, you appear to be the only one.. 
Now, that's unusual. Tell me when that was, will you please? 
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IDA RASMUSSEN: It was under Judge Hall on the 
15th of July. 
THE COURT: During this Term? 
IDA RASMUSSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And that was a --
IDA RASMUSSEN: Automobile accident. 
THE COURT: Two automobiles collided? 
IDA RASMUSSEN: Automobile and a motorcycle. 
THE COURT: And do you recall the date when that 
accident happened? I know that's asking you to--
IDA RASMUSSEN: Let's see. Sometime in July a 
year ago. 
THE COURT: All right. In 1974? 
IDA RASMUSSEN: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Did you -- were you asked to return a 
verdict in this matter? 
IDA RASMUSSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you did in fact return a verdict? 
IDA RASMUSSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Were you asked to answer certain ques-
tions with regard to the degree of negligence of the 
parties? 
IDA RASMUSSEN: Yes, in per cent wise. 
THE COURT: All right. Mrs. Rasmussen, this case 
will be somewhat different and I am going to try and 
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explain to you that the law changed in January of 1973 and 
accidents happening after that date we ask the Juries to 
apportion the negligence and with regard to accidents 
happening prior to that date we ask them not to apportion 
negligence. 
IDA RASMUSSEN: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Now, do you think that -- in other 
words, the law that I tell you will be different than 
the law that Judge Hall explained to you and do you 
believe that you could follow the law of the case as I 
state it and put out of your mind the fact that Judge Hall 
explained to you something different? 
IDA RASMUSSEN: I think so. 
THE COURT: All right. Is there anyone else? 
MR. POELMAN: Just a minute. For clarification, 
the change in law was enacted in January of !73 but the 
effective day of that was May 8th. May 8th, 1973. 
THE COURT: That's right. But in either case --
MR. POELMAN: The difference would be established, 
yes. • . 
THE COURT: Fine. Is there anyone else that 
served as a Juror on a case involving an accident 
between two vehicles, auto-pedestrian, auto-motorcycle, 
any kind of accident case? All right. Thank you. The 
-12-
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record may show no other hands are raised. 
(Transcript Page 2 line 30 through Page 4 line 27) 
•X* M * *»*-• *.•.* *A* •*"-» 
/V v\ /\ /\ /\ /\ 
Here the court made mention of a change in the law, said the 
law to be applied in this case would not permit the jury to 
apportion negligence between the parties, but did not say that 
contributory negligence by the injured party would bar recovery. 
These comments injected several elements of confusion into 
the case. First, the court referred to the statils of the law for 
accidents occurring before January, 1973, and after January, 
1973, but did not clarify the status of the law for accidents 
occurring during January, 1973. Defendants1 counsel requested 
the court to clarify the matter at that time, but the judge left 
the matter dangling with an unfinished sentence^leaving unre-
solved the timing and nature of that change as it would apply to 
this case. 
Second, the court's comments implied that the only differ-
ence between the former law and the more recent modification was 
that the court now asks the jury to apportion negligence, whereas 
in the past it did not. Presumably, therefore, the jury could 
deliberate in the same manner under the old and new laws, the 
only difference being that the court would not require the jury 
to apportion negligence under the former law. 
Third, the court at no time explained to the jury or prospective 
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jurors what is meant by "apportion negligence", a phrase that can 
only be understood in light of the real difference between 
contributory negligence and comparative negligence. 
This dialogue could only serve to raise questions in the 
minds of the jurors which were never answered in the jury in-
structions or otherwise. 
Although use of a special verdict will usually be deemed 
discretionary with the court, special circumstances such as were 
present in this case, may require the use of a special verdict 
rather than a general verdict. This court has previously noted 
in Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 P.2d 264, 267 (1957): 
[G]reat care should be taken to submit questions to the 
jury so that they are as clear as possible. When a general 
verdict will best settle the issues, it should be used. 
When specific issues cannot be reached by a general verdict, 
the trial court should take advantage of special verdicts or 
special interrogatories. 
Under these special circumstances the court erred or abused 
its discretion in failing to submit the issues on special inter-
rogatories which would have prevented the jury from improperly 
awarding damages to one whom they found to be contributorily 
negligent. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUMMON 
THE JURY PANEL AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANTS AND 
IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Appellants acknowledge the general rule that affidavits of 
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jurors are not admissible evidence for the purpose of impeaching 
the jury's own verdict, but the rule permits certain exceptions 
applicable in this case. One such exception was recognized by 
this Court in Moulton v. Staats, 83 Utah 197, 27 P.2d 455 (1933). 
In that case, the jury apparently disregarded an instruction 
given by the court, whereupon counsel moved that the jury's 
verdict be amended or modified, which motion was accompanied by 
supporting affidavits of the jurors. Opposing counsel moved to 
suppress the affidavits on the ground that the jury may not 
impeach its own verdict. In rejecting that motion, the court 
noted at page 459: 
The general rule, that the statements of jurors 
will not be received to establish their own misconduct, 
or to impeach their verdict, does not prevent the 
reception of their evidence as to what really was the 
verdict agreed on, in order to prove that, through 
mistake or otherwise, it has not been correctly ex-
pressed, as the agreement reached by the jury, and not 
the written paper filed, is the verdict; and a showing 
that the writing is incorrect is not an impeachment of 
the verdict itself. 
Affidavits of jurors are admissible to show that 
the verdict, as received and entered of record, by 
reason of a mistake, does not embody the true finding 
of the jury. 
More recently, this Court in Brown v. Johnson, 24 Utah 2d 
388, 472 P.2d 942 (1970), has followed the Moulton exception. 
When confronted with an affidavit from one of the jurors 
explaining that the general verdict submitted was inconsistent 
with the intended verdict by the jury, the court noted at page 
946 n.l: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
While jurors may not by affidavit or otherwise 
impeach their verdict, they may give proof to explain 
it. 
The court quoted at length from the Moulton decision to 
support the proposition that an affidavit by the juror may be 
used to explain the intended verdict of the jury rather than the 
verdict entered on paper. 
This court has twice declared that finding the jury "mis-
understood or disregarded the law" is a proper ground for a new 
trial. In Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701, 
703-04 (1961) this court held: 
The trial judge should not grant a new trial, 
merely because in his opinion the amount of 
the award was insufficient or excessive. 
Such action is warranted only when to the trial 
judge, "it seems clear that the jury has misapplied 
or failed to take into account proven facts; or 
misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made 
findings clearly against the weight of the 
evidence. . ." (emphasis added) (citing Mr. Justice 
Crockett's concurring opinion in Holmes v. Nelson, 
7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P. 2d 722, 752-2F719W: 
Whether the jury "misunderstood or disregarded the law" can 
best be determined from affidavits of the jurors or, where 
indication of such misunderstanding or disregard exists, through 
an examination of the jurors by the court. 
The affidavits presented in the instant case clearly show 
and explain that the real verdict reached by the jury was that 
both parties were negligent. Nevertheless, because of the con-
fusion surrounding the legal consequences of contributory negli-
gence and failure by the trial court to provide a clear instruction 
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to dispel that confusion, the jury arrived at a recorded verdict 
which was clearly inconsistent with their factual findings. 
Furthermore, the general rule prohibiting a jury from 
impeaching its own verdict has been rejected in recent cases 
where its application would bring about unjust results. For 
example, in Hunter v. Smallwood, 328 N.E.2d 344 (111. App. 
1975), the court recognized the use of affidavits by jurors in a 
case where the jury became confused by the verdict form submitted 
to them by the court. The court remarked: 
By a long established rule in this State, affidavits 
of jurors would not be admissible to impeach a duly 
rendered verdict. . . . This is a salutary rule, designed 
to prevent jury tampering and to "suppress the dis-
satisfied juror.1'. . . 
But there are some exceptions to the general rule. 
Where the record itself shows that the jury is hopelessly 
confused, or the affidavits tend to show that the 
verdict rendered and recorded was not the one agreed 
upon by the jurors, then we believe that the affidavits 
may be considered. . . . 
[I]t must be remembered that jurors are laymen and 
not accustomed to legal language. . . . The affidavits 
of the four jurors is fairly persuasive that the ver-
dict rendered was not the one which was reached by the 
jury. It is not simply a case of one juror's affidavit 
to the effect that he did not agree with the verdict or 
participate in the decision. 
Obviously the time has long since passed when the 
original jurors may be brought back into court and 
questioned concerning the verdict. As a result of the 
apparent prejudice to appellant, it is clear that some 
remedy should be forthcoming. We conclude that a new 
trial should be granted. 
Appropriate exceptions to the general rule which prohibits 
use of juror's affidavits to impeach a jury verdict must be 
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viewed in relation to the reasons for the rule. The purpose of 
the rule is not to favor finality of a verdict at the expense of 
justice. As stated in Hunter v. Smallwood, supra, the rule is 
designed to prevent jury tampering and to suppress the dissatisfied 
juror. 
Although abuse of the procedure could be damaging and 
cannot be condoned, it is fully appropriate and customary for 
counsel to talk with jurors after the verdict has been rendered. 
Indeed, Rule 59(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure con-
templates as grounds for a new trial, matters which can only be 
determined by counsel speaking with jurors after the verdict is 
rendered. 
In the present case, the affidavit of Juror Gaylen R. Coles 
(R. 53; also see Appendix A to this brief) arose from the juror's 
own later realization that the jury had misapplied the law and 
from his own request that defendants1 counsel contact him to 
discuss the error. Rather than burdening each of the other 
jurors with a request that they sign an affidavit attesting their 
common error (which might have raised a suspicion of jury tam-
pering) , defendants1 counsel submitted his own affidavit des-
cribing the conversation he had with each juror and informing the 
court that each juror believed the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent. 
The affidavit of defendants' counsel was not submitted to 
the court as conclusive evidence of the matters set forth therein, 
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but was submitted to alert the court that justice had miscarried, 
and to show substantial cause why the trial court itself should 
have examined the jurors to determine their correct findings 
concerning the issue of contributory negligence. Consideration 
of these affidavits does not in any way threaten the sanctity of 
jury verdicts, but rather strengthens trial by jury in providing 
a remedy for an injustice imposed upon defendants which is 
clearly contrary to applicable Utah law. 
If the jurors were not properly instructed on the issue of 
contributory negligence, then the court should have granted a new 
trial on that issue. If the jurors failed or refused to apply 
the correct law to that issue, then they violated their jurors' 
oath, which constitutes misconduct by the jury and is ground for 
a new trial. Where the likelihood of error or misconduct was so 
clearly established by the affidavits before the court, which 
affidavits were unopposed, the trial court erred and abused its 
discretion in failing to grant a new trial and in withholding its 
aid in preventing a miscarriage of justice. 
How can a government of laws, in the name of compliance with 
its procedural or evidentiary rules, allow a verdict to stand 
which each juror acknowledges is inconsistent with the unanimous 
findings of the jurors and is inconsistent with the law which 
should have been applied? If such were the result, we surely 
would have reached the stage in the disintegration of our legal 
system where rules originally designed to promote justice have 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
now become deadly tools to obstruct and prevent it. 
i 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO READ 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1-A TO THE JURY 
Jury Instruction No. 1-A states: 
You must weigh and consider this case without 
regard to sympathy, prejudice, or passion for or 
against any party to the action. (R. 128) 
This is a standard jury instruction designated as J.I.F.U. 
Instruction 1.5. When counsel met with Judge Sawaya in chambers 
to discuss jury instructions, defendants1 counsel requested this 
instruction (R. 82), which request was granted by the judge who 
noted his approval thereon. (R. 82) 
The court did not furnish to counsel for the parties a 
complete set of the jury instructions in the order in which they 
were given. Counsel for the parties had three sets of jury 
instructions: those requested by the plaintiff, those requested 
by the defendant, and those standard instructions which the court 
said it would give in addition to certain designated instructions 
requested by the parties. 
Through a clerical oversight, Instruction No. 1-A was not 
included in the instructions read by the court to the jury. This 
omission was not observed by defendants1 counsel until plaintiffs' 
counsel had commenced his highly emotional argument through most 
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of which plaintiff, Judith Johnson, sat at the counsel table in 
tears. At one point, when speaking of the accident and the 
plaintiff's injuries, plaintiffs' counsel became emotional, 
choked up, asked the jury's indulgence while he paused, withdrew 
a handkerchief from his pocket and wiped away the tears from his 
own eyes. (Tr. 169.; See also Supplemental Transcript of Pro-
ceedings on October 6, 1975, pp. 3 and 4) 
As soon as plaintiff's counsel concluded the opening portion 
of his closing testimony, the court ordered a brief recess, 
whereupon counsel for the parties met with Judge Sawaya in 
chambers. The court acknowledged that defendants' requested Jury 
Instruction No. 9 had been inadvertently omitted from the jury 
instructions given. The court expressed reluctance, however, 
about highlighting that instruction by reading it separately to 
the jury at that stage. To help minimize the damage done by such 
omission, defendants' counsel agreed to read Instruction 1-A 
during his closing argument without reference to the fact that it 
had not been read by the court. The omitted instruction was 
assigned its No. 1~A and a copy was placed in the compilation of 
jury instructions sent with the jury to the jury room. (See 
Supplemental Transcript of Proceedings on October 6, 1975, pp. 3 
and 4) 
Because the jury did not receive directly from the judge the 
contents of the omitted instruction, any effort by defendants' 
counsel to supply the contents of that instruction was insuf-
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ficient to instill in the jury the importance of the instruction 
since it lacked the explicit authoritative approval by the court. 
While it is impossible to know whether the jury thought that 
Jury Instruction No. 1-A had been read to them by the judge or 
whether they thought defendants1 counsel was usurping the pre-
rogatives of the court by giving instructions not included with 
those given by the court, the irregularity in failing to give 
such a basic, standard instruction, especially in view of the 
emotion demonstrated in the courtroom by plaintiffs and their 
counsel, was of substantial prejudice to the defendants and a 
proper ground meriting reversal or a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the court (1) failed to instruct the jury that a 
finding of contributory negligence would bar an award of damages 
to the plaintiff, (2) failed to submit the issues to the jury on 
a special vereict where great confusion existed concerning a 
change in the law and what law was applicable to the present 
case, (3) failed to summon the jury panel and rectify the mis-
carriage of justice which was apparent from unopposed affidavits 
and (4) omitted reading to the jury a standard instruction that 
they must weigh and consider the case without regard to sympathy, 
prejudice or passion for or against any party to the action, the 
court should either have entered a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict or granted defendants' motion for a ne\«7 trial. 
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Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed or the case remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
POELMAN, FOX, EDWARDS &.OSWALD 
,OYD P0E1 
36 South State Street 
Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Served two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Brief on Respondents by delivering them 
to E. H. Fankhauser at 430 Judge 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
/V" day of March, 1976. 
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APPENDIX A 
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STRONG, POELMAN & FOX (Poeltnan) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
36 South State Street, Suite 2000 
The Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-7751 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FLOYD A. JOHNSON and FLOYD A. 
JOHNSON as guardian ad litem 
for JUDITH JOHNSON, a minor, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOLENE JAYE SIMONS, a minor, 
and DAN C. SIMONS, 
Defendants. 
A F F I D A V I T 
C i v i l No. 216,731 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned Galen R. Coles, being first duly sworn 
on oath deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the jurors which was selected as part of 
the panel which heard the above-entitled case on September 9 
through September 11, 1975, having voted in favor of the 
verdict which was entered on September 11, 1975. 
2. Shortly after entering the jury room and selecting a 
foreman, a poll was taken by the jurors to determine whether 
they believed that either the defendant Jolene Simons or the 
plaintiff Judith Johnson was negligent in causing the automobile-
pedestrian accident on June 13, 1973. The results of 
that poll were that all jurors stated that they believed the 
plaintiff Judith Johnson was negligent and all of the jurors 
except George S. Davis stated that they believed the defendant 
Jolene Simons was negligent. 
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3. Having so determined, the jurors then proceeded to 
determine what damages should be awarded to the plaintiff. 
4. It is my clear understanding and firm belief that at 
the time the award was made and the verdict entered all of the 
members of the jury panel, myself included, believed that at 
the time of the accident the plaintiff Judith Johnson was 
standing in the roadway and that she was negligent in being 
there rather than remaining off to the side of the roadway 
until it was safe for her to cross or otherwise move upon the 
roadway. 
5. I further firmly believe that none of the jurors 
understood that if we found the plaintiff to be contributorily 
negligent then no award of damages should have been made. 
6. I have read the foregoing and declare the content 
thereof to be true of my own knowledge except as to matters 
set forth upon information and belief and as to such matters . 
I believe them to be true. 
mLi^A, (<^<c&L 
\m R. COLES 
4458 Koneywood Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / 0 day of 
September, 1975. 
&> UL^JLQ^U^ 
/ NOTARY FUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My commission expires: 
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BY ..../-• 
pv-w 
/"CLLHK* 
STRONG, POELMAN & FOX (Poelman) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
36 South State Street, Suite 2000 
The Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-7751 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FLOYD A. JOHNSON and FLOYD A. 
JOHNSON as guardian ad litem 
for JUDITH JOHNSON, a minor, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOLENE JAYE SIMONS, a minor, 
and DAN C. SIMONS, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
} s s 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
A F F I D A V I T 
C i v i l No. 216,731 
The undersigned B. Lloyd Poelman, first being duly sworn 
on oath deposes and says: • 
1. I am counsel for defendants in this action and I 
am familiar with the proceedings herein. 
2. On September 11, 1975, after two days of evidence 
and testimony, the above entitled court submitted the issues 
in this action to the panel of eight jurors, namely George 
S. Davis, Helen Dille, Robyn Johanson, Wayne Croft, Galen 
R. Coles, Faline L. Beal, Gerald J. Facer, and Karen L. Cannon. 
3. The case was submitted upon instructions requiring 
the. jury to find of favor of the defendants if they found 
that the plaintiff Judith Johnson was contributorily negligent 
in causing the accident and the injuries suffered on January 
13, 1973. The jury returned its verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff and awarding judgment against the defendants in 
the sum of $1,500 for special damages and $35,000 general 
damages. 
56 
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" 4. I have spoken with all eight of the jurors. In 
each instance the jurors voluntarily stated to me that they 
found that both Judith Johnson and Jolene Jaye Simons were 
negligent in causing the accident and injuries. My first 
question to each of the jurors was why they awarded $1,500 
in special damages rather than $6,774.83, which was the total 
of the invoices submitted. The jurors uniformly stated that 
they did so because they believed that insurance had probably 
paid 80% of the medical expenses incurred. My next question 
in each instance was where they believed Judith Johnson was > 
standing when she was struck. All of the jurors reported . 
that they concluded she was standing in the road. All of 
the jurors also stated that Judith Johnson was negligent 
in standing on the road rather than remaining off the road 
until the way was clear for her to proceed. 
5. On September 13, 1975 at 1:30 o1clock p.m. I telephoned 
Robyn Johanson (484-9864), who stated "It was my ovm personal 
feeling that there was negligence on the part of both girls 
but that more fault fell on the driver." He also stated that 
the Johnson girl was on the street and that it was negligent 
for her to be there at the time of the accident. He stated 
that the jurors speculated on whether there was insurance and 
that is why they awarded only a part of the special damages. 
6. On September 13, 1975 at 1:40 o'clock p.m. I telephoned 
Faline L. Beal (266-8763), who served as foreman of the jury. 
Mrs. Beal stated that she definitely believed that there was 
negligence on the part of both parties, that she assumed Niss 
Johnson was on the street at the time of the accident, and 
that the amount of the award which otherwise would have been 
made was lowered because Miss Johnson was also negligent. 
7. On September 13, 1975 at 1:45 o'clock p.m. I telephoned 
Gerald J. Facer (299-0736), who stated that it was apparent 
from the invoice billings comprising Exhibit P-8 that Mr. 
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Johnson had insurance coverage, which the jurors assumed 
was with Aetna through his Federal Government employment. 
He said, "The reason we cut it (the award) down so far was 
that the group felt she was standing in the roadway and there 
was negligence on both girls." Mr. Facer also stated that 
all seven of the jurors who voted in favor of the verdict 
thought there was negligence on both parties. When I asked 
Mr. Facer whether he was aware that if the jury found Miss 
Johnson was contributorily negligent they should not have 
made a money award, he replied that the group felt that the 
greater negligence was on Jolene. 
8. On September 14, 1975 at 2:45 o'clock p.m. I telephoned 
Karen L. Cannon (966-0346), who stated "I figured the accident 
was both of their fault." She said she concluded that the 
Johnson girl was on the road at the time of the accident 
and that she should not have been on the street. She said 
in her judgment the girls shared the blame 50-50. When I 
asked whether she was aware that no money award should have 
been granted if both parties were negligent, she said that 
she and one of the male jurors thought that was the instruction 
and asked about it; that the jury foreman looked through 
the instructions and couldn't find anything to that effect; 
and that consequently the seven jurors voted in favor of 
an award even though they believed Judith Johnson was also 
negligent. . 
9. On September 15, 1975 at 8:50 o'clock a.m. 1 telephoned 
Helen Dille (364-8264), who stated that the jury assumed 
there was insurance coverage and therefore they awarded only 
part of the special damages. She further stated that she 
believed both parties were at fault in causing the accident 
and that she was not aware that no award should be given 
if they believed Judith Johnson was also partly at fault 
in causing the accident. 
-3- ' 5S Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10. On September 15, 1975 I received a telephone message 
asking me to phone Galen R. Coles. I phoned him at home that 
evening and he said that he had come to the conclusion that 
the jury had not followed the instructions of the court and 
he felt terrible about it. He explained that shortly after 
retiring to the jury room and selecting a foreman, a straw 
poll was taken and all of the jurors except Mr. Davis stated 
their belief that both of the girls were negligent in 
causing the accident, but Mr. Davis believed only the pedes-
trian was negligent. Mr. Coles also stated his personal 
belief that Miss Johnson was standing in the roadway at the* 
time of the collision and that she was negligent in being 
there. 
11. On September 17, 1975 at 9:45 o'clock a.m. I tele-
phoned Wayne Croft at his place of employment (486-1304). 
Mr. Croft stated that he believed Judith Johnson was standing 
in the roadway at the time of the accident and in so doing 
she was contributorily negligent. He further stated that he 
understood the instructions of the court to mean that if she 
was contributorily negligent no award of damages should be 
made to the plaintiffs, but that he disregarded that instruc-
tion and made an award of damages anyway because he knew that 
Miss Johnson had suffered a great deal. 
12. I have read the foregoing and declare the content 
thereof to be true of my own knowledge except as to matters 
set forth upon information and belief and as to such matters 
I believe them to be true. * ^ . 
/B. LLOYD F G E L H M 
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